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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950665-CA 
v. 
LARRY HELQUIST : Priority Tin ~ 
Defendant A^L^,. ..;„. : 
hirZzF OF APPELLEE 
I 
J U R I S D I C T I 0 | |^ N A T U R E 0 F PROCEEDING 
This 1.3 an apoe-i' from an OrdeT* - :: *;he Seventh Mstrict Court 
date'? -\ * . ! -_ n v , : r - .-
This Court gra^tc: Defendant s Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
pursuant "-• ' f~'^  -'*•*- RUioc - "•roeilaic riucedure by 
Cr-i- -*...-
II 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
The follow—--; * ssues are presented on Appeal: 
1 Is 
dispatcher g^/e tze officer reasonable suspicion re inquire further 
with r^gar^ * - *"•"-• ~ ^-UTstsn-e? surround": nq the Defendant? 
2 ...... . : . i: , given the weather 
circumstances ana location of :;:e st..;^  , to request the Defendant to 
accompany him to the lobby of the Public Safety Building for the 
purpose of giving him a field sobriety test? Was this an arrest or 
a reasonable detention? Was it beyond the scope of the original 
stop, or does it matter? 
The Court of Appeals reviews the factual finding underlying 
the Trial Court's decision on a Motion to Suppress under the 
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Troyer, 279 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 
(Utah, 1995). State v. Brown, 853 P 2d. 851, 854 (Utah 1992). The 
Court will find clear error only if it decides that the factual 
findings made by the Trial Court are not adequately supported by 
the record. State v. Pena, 869 P 2d. 932, 935-936, (Utah 1994). 
In addition, the Court of Appeals considers the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Trial Court's determination. However, the 
Court of Appeals reviews the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law based 
on such facts under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 
P 2d. 774, 781-782, (Utah 1991), "according no deference to its 
legal conclusions. But affording a measure of discretion to the 
trial court," State v. Spurqeon, 904 P 2d. 220, 225, (Utah App. 
1995). 
Ill 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
2 
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides [Section 
14] unreasonable searches forbidden-issuance of a 
warrant• 
Text; - ... . as Amendment Form of the United Sra".-.; 
Constitution* 
I V" 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant war3 "harged with divine -*- tip influence of 
Annotated, 1953 a- amendec .: \ J person unaer sixteen years or 
aqe preset" - r^ -.~ a Misdemeanor. Defendant filed =» Met•on t~< 
c 
the result: :: nis :;eid sobriety tes:? ^:ic inythinc flowing from 
the o^fi^ov-'s discussion wiui cue ucienaanL ui his conduct. 
Ler^n^ant asserts that the report from the own^r or cl . 
the store vi\.i regard to h :i s condition, wa: insufficient for - h^ 
Trc~r~r establish reasonable suspicic - •- uhe car. 
Deter^dnL lurtner asserts that the T-pqiiPQf ' ,.. .:ccper to take 
the Defendant five blocks t: the * ub.:c Safety 
thereby the condu:r :td result cf the field sobriety tests, and the 
Tne trial c^^it ^enied the Mct..^
 ruiess from, which the 
Defendant took this interlocutory appeal. 
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V 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts recited below are drawn from the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact and the transcript of the hearing on Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress and are recited in the light most favorable to 
the Trial Court's Findings. State v. Pena, 869 P 2d. 932, 935-936, 
(Utah 1994), State v. Anderson, 283 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1996). 
On January 7th, 1996, the San Juan County Sheriff's Office 
dispatch received a call from an employee or owner of Blue Mountain 
Foods (Court's finding No. 3, 4, and 5), reporting an altercation 
between the check-out person or store owner (T. pg. 5, lines 10-14) 
and a person who was obviously intoxicated. Trooper Randall 
received information that there was a strong odor of alcohol (T. 
pg. 5, line 17), that the store personnel believed the person to be 
drunk (T. pg. 5, line 19), and a description of the car as a small 
red vehicle (T. pg. 6, line 10). Request was made that the officers 
not respond or apprehend the person within the store (T. pg. 6, 
line 3-5). The second officer, Trooper Hall, also heard the 
dispatch and believed that the management of Blue Mountain Foods 
had called and given the information (T. pg 13, line 3). He 
described the circumstance as a customer under the influence of 
alcohol (T. pg 13, line 5), with a strong odor of alcohol about him 
(T. pg 13, line 5), who had been in a fight with the store clerk 
(T. pg.13, line 7). Trooper Hall understood that the store 
personnel did not want the person confronted in the store (T pg.13, 
line 8) and the individual was driving a little red car (T. pg 13, 
4 
line n l Trooper Randall app xoached the parkinc !! ;t of Blue 
Mountain Foods a nd noticed only one red ~-'~ ; n *"'~-* r ? . r k i ~ ~ "' " . 
I Il in Il"'i| I "ll| 'L'lie Trooper wen t: t: :: • the •-.. . „i i.-~ c „ c - :.. n-a:-;^  
d U-t.urn and Decame stuck (T. pg. 6, line 2 5 ) . Trooper Randall 
radioed Trooper Hall to make the stop and Trooper H a n r -cceeded to 
Blue Mountain toods f stopped his car up the street so tnau he could 
observe the parking let: and watched Mr. Heiquist exit the store and 
enter the sma^ :ed cai (i. 
Trooper z~~~l positioner .. , ^dcrci J^, where Mr. Heiquist 
could not leave tie parking lot: and approach . •:>-- vehicle. 
Trc " ' ' * • ' -• 
thfc .-',J.OILVJ v..«•- i -~ *.ioiic. „ - -.. - a".u ^iiiired speecn 
of trie drive: line 4 • * While th^ requested items were 
b e : * • -. • • . : 
told Trooper Rcanaal^ "what: they haa an-,: \_. :ed tue investigation 
over to Trooper Ran-i^;/ ',.;*•* "rocp^r Ha assist inr*. Trooper 
I * 
Jot .is he we;:*", t * . iround * - talking 
^,^f- u Mr- * He 1 cru i ?*• , ^^ ob ^  erT"^d ~ ^ »- -*" r^n T " ' * '~ * ->i ^ ^^^ ' ^^™ * *-"^  
* • i • 
he n&ii had any aiccn:- L , Mr. Heiquist stated r ,.*.\ he r :i r;a-i fiur or 
five beers " '. * -^~ ; . /^  "*~1 *- O^fi^07"3 had orevi^'is^" ^ *-"•> --
C O A.'-. . 
store employees inside the store/ and because of the snowy and 
S"*:~P -* v ' - - v •--T lot, Trooper Randall felt that n 
.^;: t-r:r-p -- - ., field sobriety test i n the parking 
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lot (T. pg 8, line 5-8). Trooper Randall explained this 
circumstance to Mr. Helquist, who then requested that he be allowed 
to go to his home to be given the field sobriety tests (T.pg 8, 
line 12). Trooper Randall and Trooper Hall made arrangements for 
Trooper Hall to stay with the car and the Defendant's young 
daughter until Trooper Randall could conduct the field sobriety 
tests in the lobby of the Public Safety Building (T. pg 26, line 
22). Officer Randall placed Defendant in the patrol car, drove him 
five blocks (T pg. 28, line 16,) to the Public Safety Building. 
The Defendant was in the patrol vehicle with no handcuffs (T. pg. 
33, line 10) in the front seat with the officer (T. pg 33, line 
14), and he consented to go to the Public Safety Building (T. 33, 
line 20) . The Court found that the Court had him in custody and it 
was a level 2 transport, (pg 49, line 8-21), asserting that the 
Trooper was taking him to the building for field sobriety purposes 
and had a right to do so. 
The Defendant failed his field sobriety tests and Trooper 
Randall radioed Trooper Hall that Defendant had failed the field 
sobriety tests and would be placed under arrest (T. pg 34, line 
12). Trooper Hall had waited at his vehicle with the Defendant's 
daughter in the parking lot of Blue Mountain Food and upon hearing 
that the Defendant had failed the field sobriety tests, made 
arrangements to tow the vehicle and took the groceries and the 
daughter to her home (T. pg 35, line 15-23). The arrest for DUI 
was made at the Public Safety Building (T. pg. 27, line 18). 
6 
The Court found that Mr. Helquist was not under arrest when he 
was brought to the lobby of the Public Safety Building to perform 
the field sobriety tests (F of F. par. 19). The Court found that 
Troopers Randall and Hall, by virtue of the call made to the 
Sheriff's Office and the description of the individual and his 
activities at Blue Mountain Foods, had reasonable suspicion to make 
the original stop and to do additional testing to check whether the 
occupant was under the influence (F of F Par. 21). 
VI 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court properly determined that the officers had 
reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant based upon the telephone 
call from an employee or owner of Blue Mountain Foods reporting the 
altercation which had occurred in the store, that Defendant was 
obviously intoxicated, that there was a strong odor of alcohol, and 
that he was "drunk". The store personnel gave the gender of the 
person and a description of the car and requested that the 
individual not be confronted in the store. Trooper Randall 
observed only one small red vehicle when he drove by the parking 
lot. The Trooper had reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
occupant of the red vehicle was the person who had the difficulties 
within the store. The informants were not confidential; their 
identity was communicated by dispatch. This gave additional 
reliability to the report sufficient for the Troopers to have 
reasonable suspicion to stop and inquire further. Upon inquiry, 
the Troopers observed the individual driving the vehicle to have 
7 
slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol about him. Defendant 
additionally gave an indication to the Troopers that he had had 
four to five beers. Based upon these indications, the Trooper had 
reasonable suspicion to believe the Defendant was indeed 
intoxicated. It was reasonable for the officer to find a suitable 
place to conduct the field sobriety test that would make the 
results of the tests fair to the Defendant. 
It was not unreasonable for the Trooper to take the Defendant 
to a neutral place, to wit: The lobby of the Public Safety 
Building, which was five blocks from this location. The 
conditions in the parking lot on this day were slushy and wet, to 
the extent that one of the Highway Patrolmen became stuck trying to 
turn around. Whether Mr. Helquist was arrested at this point or 
not, the Trooper still had the right to take Mr. Helquist to a 
suitable, neutral location for the conducting of a field sobriety 
test. Mr. Helquist failed the field sobriety tests and was placed 
under arrest. 
The Trooper was within his rights to transport the individual 
to this location and to conduct the additional tests based upon his 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Helquist may be intoxicated and may 
be driving under the influence of alcohol. 
The Trial Court was right in denying the Motion to Suppress 
and therefore, this Court should uphold the decision of the Trial 





THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
TROOPER'S HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP 
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE. 
A stop is justified if there is reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant is involved in criminal activity (Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 77-7-15f (1990). While the required level of suspicion is 
lower than the standard for probable cause for arrest, the same 
totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to determine 
if there are sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to support 
reasonable suspicion. State v. Case, 884 P 2d. 1274, 1276, (Utah 
App. 1994), (Quoting: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 21, United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8, (1989) Accord, State v. Bello, 
871 P 2d. 584, 587 (Ut. App. 1994), State v. Stricklinq, 844 P 2d. 
983 (Utah App. 1992) . 
In our case the reasonable suspicion for the stop is based on 
the information given Trooper Randall and Trooper Hall from the 
San Juan County Sheriff's Office Dispatch. In accordance with the 
above standards, did the totality of the facts and circumstances 
expressed to the Troopers support a reasonable suspicion? In Case, 
Id., the Utah Court of Appeals overturned the investigative stop of 
an automobile where the Court indicated "no legally sufficient, 
reasonable suspicion exists in the absence of a demonstrated 
factual basis for the issuing department's information." Case, Id. 
at 1279. The Court was concerned because the Officer's had merely 
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received descriptive information about the vehicle and a 
description of the possible suspect, but no information had been 
given to support any reasonable suspicion for or the necessity for 
the stop. There was no source of information from which the 
officer could determine that a crime had been committed or was 
likely to be committed. 
Another recent case from the Utah Court of Appeals has visited 
the issue of when reasonable suspicion can be obtained through a 
dispatch report. In State v. Nguyen, 878 P 2d. 1183, (Utah App. 
1994), a Utah County dispatcher had received information about 
individuals in a vehicle who had been trying to sell large amounts 
of quarters to businesses in Spanish Fork Canyon. An attempt to 
locate call (ATL) relayed the following information: (1) the color 
and possible make of the car driven by suspects; (2) an accurate 
license plate number; (3) the race and gender of the suspects; (4) 
the direction the vehicle was heading; (5) details of the suspects 
conduct attempting to sell large amounts of quarter wrapped in 
yellow note paper; (6) several business operator's reports of 
concerns about their encounter with suspect; and (7) reports of the 
recent burglary in Price. Note that none of these items constitute 
illegal activity. However, the Court found that such information 
could reasonably lead an officer to conclude, based on a totality 
of the circumstances that criminal activity may be afoot and the 
Court of Appeals therefore held that the trial court did not error 
in determining that law enforcement officials had reasonable 
10 
suspicion justifying the stop of defendant's vehicle. The Court 
further holding: 
"...the conduct observed and/or the information relied 
upon need not be legal or describe illegal activity in 
order to give a law enforcement officer reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity so long as the officer can 
articulate facts which form the basis for his or her 
suspicion. (State v. Menke, 787 P 2d. 537, 541, (Ut. 
App. 1990)." Nguyen at 1186. 
Like Nguyen, the Troopers in this case had information that 
business owners had reported suspicious activities of the 
defendant. Information from citizen informants is generally given 
a high degree of reliability. Reliability and veracity are 
generally assumed when the informant receives nothing from the 
police in exchange for the information. State v. Blaha, 851 P 2d. 
1205, 1208 (Ut. App. 1993). (Quoting State v. Purser, 828 P 2d. 
515, 517, (Ut. App. 1992)), 
"In other cases, if the circumstances as a whole 
demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, 
a less strong showing is required, Id. at 1205-1206." 
(Purser at 517). 
Reliability and veracity are generally assumed when the 
informant is a citizen who receives nothing from the police in 
exchange for the information. Quoting other cases, the Courts have 
consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the 
informant's knowledge is based on personal observation." In State 
v. Brown, 798 P 2d. 284 at 286, (Ut. App 1990) the Court said: 
"Courts view the testimony of citizen informers with less 
rigid scrutiny than the testimony of police informers. 
State v. Treadwav, 499 P 2d. 846, 848, (Ut. 1972). In 
State v. Miller, 740 P 2d at 1364 (Ct. App. 1987) 
statements in the search warrants were based on 
information from defendant's neighbors. The Court noted 
that vthe average neighbor witness is not the type of 
11 
informant in need of independent proof of reliability or 
veracity" Id. at 1366; see State v. Harris, 671, P 2d. 
175, 180, (Ut. 1983). This is because citizen informers, 
unlike police informers, volunteer information out of 
concern for the community and not for personal benefit." 
In our circumstance both of the Troopers, who heard the 
dispatch report and responded to the scene, testified. Trooper 
Randall testified that (1) the report had been made by an employee 
or owner of Blue Mountain Foods; (2) that the customer had been in 
an altercation with the store clerk; (3) that the customer was 
obviously intoxicated; (4) that there was a strong odor of 
alcohol about the person; (5) that the store personnel deemed the 
person "drunk"; (6) the gender of the individual; (7) the color 
and description of the car; and (8) that the store personnel did 
not want a response inside the store. Officer Hall heard the same 
dispatch report, reported in much the same fashion, and testified 
that he heard the indication that the customer was under the 
influence of alcohol and that there was strong odor of alcohol 
about the individual. Trooper Randall testified that as he drove 
by the parking lot, he observed very few cars in the parking lot, 
and only one small red car. Trooper Hall testified that he stopped 
up the street from the parking lot and observed a male subject 
enter a small red car within the parking lot. 
In State v. Roth, 827 P 2d. 255, the dispatcher had informed 
the investigating officer of a "drunk driver", provided the gender 
of the individual, a description and the color of the automobile, 
the license number and the vehicle's location. The information had 
been transmitted by the University Medical Center Security Office, 
12 
which had identified itself to the dispatcher. Unlike an anonymous 
informant, this gave the information additional reliability and is 
similar to our case where the individuals identified themselves. 
Like in Roth, Trooper Hall's own observation of the individual 
entering the small red vehicle corroborated the dispatcher's 
report. In Roth, the Officer had far less information, yet the 
Court upheld reasonable suspicion, justifying the approach of the 
defendant by the officers, stating: 
"However, in the case at bar, the dispatcher did indeed 
communicate a factual foundation for the dispatch, 
specifically the existence of a drunk driver along with 
the description of the driver's vehicle, license number 
and location. The specific factual foundation provided 
in the dispatch equipped the arresting officer with 
sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop Roth's car." 
The holding in Roth is particularly applicable to our case 
where the Court stated: 
"In sum, Officer Bradfield had reasonable suspicion to 
make the stop of Roth's vehicle. Where as, here, a 
reliable source with reasonable suspicion based on 
articulated facts reports the commission of a crime, 
based on the relayed facts the dispatcher communicates 
the information to police and the responding officer's 
own observation corroborate the dispatch, we find that 
reasonable suspicion exists for the stop." 
The finding that the Troopers had reasonable suspicion to stop 
the Defendant's vehicle should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TROOPERS DETENTION OF MR. HELQUIST AND 
REQUEST THAT HE BE TAKEN TO THE LOBBY OF THE 
PUBLIC SAFETY BUILDING TO CONDUCT THE FIELD 
SOBERITY TESTS WERE REASONABLE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
13 
In addition to the information which the Troopers had in order 
to find reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, they testified 
that they could smell the strong odor of alcohol coming from the 
person of Mr. Helquist at the time they were making the decision to 
take Mr. Helquist to the Public Safety Building for the purpose of 
conducting field soberity tests (T. pg. 7, line 23). Also, 
Defendant told Trooper Randall that he had had four to five beers 
(T. pg 8, line 2), and the Troopers noted that Defendant's speech 
was slurred (T. pg 14, line 4). These additional factors gave the 
Troopers probable cause to arrest Mr. Helquist for drunk driving, 
without the necessity of performing the field sobreity test. The 
fact that the Trooper stated in his testimony that, in his 
impression, Mr. Helquist had not been placed under arrest at this 
time does not matter if the Trooper was otherwise legally justified 
to place Defendant under arrest at that time. This principal is 
set forth in State v. Spurqeon, 904 P 2d. 220, 228, (Ut. App. 
1995), wherein the Court stated, quoting Scott v. United States, 
436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168, (1978): 
"The fact that the officer does not have the state of 
mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provided 
the legal justification for the officer's action, does 
not invalidate the action taken, so long as the 
circumstance is viewed objectively to justify that 
action." (Accord State v. Lopez, 873 P 2d. 1127, 1137 
(Utah 1994). 
The state of mind of the Trooper as to whether Mr. Helquist 
was under arrest at the time simply does not matter. The Court in 
Lopezr as quoted in Spurqeon, stated: 
14 
"The Fourth Amendment simply does not require an 
officer's state of mind to perfectly correspond to 
his/her legally justified actions." 
It is clear that the Trooper was legally justified in 
arresting Mr. Helquist, given the information which has been above 
enumerated. His actions in taking Mr. Helquist to the Public 
Safety Building can be justified as being incident to arrest, 
thereby there is no impermissible detention. 
Arguing alternatively, that Mr. Helquist was not placed under 
arrest at this time, what does reasonable suspicion allow the 
officer to do with respect to conducting additional inquiry to 
determine if probable cause can be obtained? 
The Court has made a finding in this case that this was a 
level two stop. The Court has found at Finding 21, that the 
Trooper had the right to make additional tests to check whether the 
occupant was under the influence. The Court found that Mr. 
Helquist's transportation to the Public Safety Building was 
consensual and that he was not under arrest
 f indicating that he was 
placed in the front seat of the patrol car, that he was not 
handcuffed, and that the indicia of arrest were not present. The 
Officer testified that, in his belief, the conditions in the 
parking lot at Blue Mountain Foods were not fair to the Defendant. 
In other words, the snowy, slushy conditions within the parking 
lot would not have given Mr. Helquist a fair opportunity to pass 
the tests. Therefore, the Court found at Finding 23, it was not 
unreasonable for the Trooper to accompany Defendant to the Public 
Safety Building to perform the test. 
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A Trooper having reasonable suspicion may conduct a brief 
inquiry into the circumstances involving the defendant in order to 
determine whether the crime has been committed. 
State v. Lopez, 873 P 2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) states: 
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention smust be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop' Florida v. Royer 460 
U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L 3d. 2d 229 
(1983). Both the slength and [the] scope1 of the 
detention must be vstrictly tied to and justified by1 
the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible1" State v. Johnson 805 P 2d 761, 763 (Utah 
1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. 
Ct. at 1887). Also quoted in State v. Parker 834 P 2d 
592 (Utah App. 1992) (State v. Godina-Luna 826 P 2d 652, 
654, (Utah App. 1992) ) 
If reasonable suspicion exists, the officer is authorized to 
detain based on the totality of the circumstances facing the 
officer at the time of the stop. Lopez at 1132. The officer must 
"^diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it 
[is] necessary to detain the defendant'" (State v. Grovier 808 P 2d 
133, 136 (Ut. App. 1991) (quoting United States v. Sharpe 420 U.S. 
675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985)) 
In Grovier the officers took 90 minutes to conduct their 
investigation. The Court stated that the focus is not on the time 
taken, but "rather the focus is upon the means used by the officers 
to dispel their suspicions". In this analysis the Supreme Court 
has chosen not to define a bright-line rule, but has stated "common 
sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid 
criteria" (Sharpe at 685.) 
16 
It was reasonable to take Mr. Helquist to the Public Safety 
Building to diligently pursue the investigation and to confirm or 
dispel suspicion. This course of action was simpler and faster 
than trying to determine what other facilities might be available. 
This was common sense and within the Trooper's discretion and was 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
The decision of the District Court to deny Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress should be upheld. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should uphold the 
decision of the Trial Court on its ruling to deny suppression of 
the evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 29th DAY OF MAY, 1996. 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juaa County Attorney 
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